Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

Contents:

Author Info

  • Martinez, Jose Vicente
  • Sandleris, Guido

Abstract

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560611000799
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 (October)
Pages: 909-930

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:909-930

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

Related research

Keywords: Sovereign debt Sovereign default Bilateral trade Sanctions;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  3. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July.
  4. Lane, Philip R, 1999. "North-South Lending with Moral Hazard and Repudiation Risk," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 50-58, February.
  5. Sandleris, Guido, 2008. "Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 267-275, December.
  6. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1989. "Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang," NBER Working Papers 2850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1997. "Reviving reputation models of international debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 21-30.
  8. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," Working Papers 042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  9. repec:att:wimass:8903 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
  11. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1985. "Debt and Default in the 1930s: Causes and Consequences," CEPR Discussion Papers 75, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1996. "Determinants and impacts of sovereign credit ratings," Research Paper 9608, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  13. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
  14. Ozler, Sule, 1993. "Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 608-20, June.
  15. Rose, Andrew K & Spiegel, Mark, 2002. "A Gravity Model of International Lending: Trade, Default and Credit," CEPR Discussion Papers 3539, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:909-930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.