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Sovereign Defaults: Information, Investment and Credit

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Author Info
Guido Sandleris

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Abstract

Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default, ever repay foreign creditors? And, correspondingly, why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns? This paper finds general conditions under which, even in the absence of sanctions, lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game. Furthermore, it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria. In this way, it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations, the two classical explanations, are necessary to enforce repayment. Information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results. The repayment/default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy. Governments repay to affect agents' expectations about them. A default, through its effect on expectations about fundamentals, can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets. Governments repay to avoid these costs, but may default (in equilibrium) when hit by a negative shock.

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Paper provided by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in its series Business School Working Papers with number 2008-04.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:2008-04

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Jose Vicente Martinez and Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Is it Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline in Trade," Business School Working Papers 2008-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Cole, Harold L & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1998. "Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, February.
  8. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luis A. V. Catao & Ana Fostel & Sandeep Kapur, 2008. "Persistent Gaps and Default Traps," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0803, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Niepelt, Dirk, 2008. "Debt Maturity without Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2006. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," NBER Working Papers 12783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is thePrivate Sector Affected?," IMF Working Papers 09/29, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Carlos Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," Working Paper Series 2006-21, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Oren Sussman & Alexander Guembel, 2005. "Sovereign Debt Without Default Penalties," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe17, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  7. Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2006. "Has the Legal Threat to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Become Real?," Business School Working Papers legalthreat, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  8. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  9. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Working Paper 08-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008. "Sovereign Theft: Theory And Evidence About Sovereign Default And Expropriation," CAMA Working Papers 2008-07, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2008. "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," NBER Working Papers 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Jose Vicente Martinez and Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Is it Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline in Trade," Business School Working Papers 2008-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  13. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2009. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Business School Working Papers 2009-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Brutti, Filippo, 2008. "Legal enforcement, public supply of liquidity and sovereign risk," MPRA Paper 13949, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2007. "The economics of sovereign defaults," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 163-187. [Downloadable!]
  16. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2008. "Heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default," Working Paper 07-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  17. Arellano, Cristina, 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies," MPRA Paper 7867, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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