This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Reviving reputation models of international debt

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Harold L. Cole
Patrick J. Kehoe

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A traditional explanation for why sovereign countries repay debt is that they want to keep a good reputation so they can easily borrow more. This explanation does not hold if a country has access to an adequate means of savings regardless of the country's past actions. With such access, a country gets only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such benefits cannot support borrowing. However, if a country is involved in a myriad of trust relationships, the country's reputation can spill over to a nondebt relationship which has enduring benefits. Such a spillover can allow a country's reputation to support a large amount of borrowing.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2112.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2112.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its journal Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): Win ()
Pages: 21-30
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1997:i:win:p:21-30:n:v.21no.1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 90 Hennepin Avenue, P.O. Box 291, Minneapolis, MN 55480-0291
Phone: (612) 204-5000
Web page: http://minneapolisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: International finance;

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay and Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access?," Business School Working Papers 2008-02, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Marc Weidenmier, 2004. "Gunboats, Reputation, and Sovereign Repayment: Lessons from the Southern Confederacy," NBER Working Papers 10960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2006. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," NBER Working Papers 12783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Aart Kraay & Norman Loayza & Luis Servén & Jaume Ventura, 2000. "Country portfolios," Economics Working Papers 913, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  6. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade," Working Papers 042002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2008. "Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," NBER Working Papers 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Jose Vicente Martinez and Guido Sandleris, 2008. "Is it Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline in Trade," Business School Working Papers 2008-01, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  9. Fernando Broner & Jaume Ventura, 2005. "Globalization and Risk Sharing," Economics Working Papers 837, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Arellano, Cristina, 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies," MPRA Paper 7867, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Wasseem Mina & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2002. "IMF Lending, Maturity of International Debt and Moral Hazard," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0301, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All the bibliographic data shown here has been contributed by volunteers, thereby helping to keep this service free.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.