One reason why countries service their external debts is the fear that default might lead to shrinkage of international trade. If so, then creditors should systematically lend more to countries with which they share closer trade links. We develop a simple theoretical model to capture this intuition, then test and corroborate this idea.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3539.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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