We show that the joint presence of moral hazard and repudiation risk generates an importnat interaction effect. In order to provide the proper incentives to borrowers, the optimal financial contract under moral hazard calls for all available resources to be paid to the lender in the event of a poor realization for output. Repudiation risk limits the size of this transfer, as the debtor has the option to default. This upper bound on the resource transfer exacerbates the moral hazard problem, reducing lending and the equilibrium level of investment and output.
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Paper provided by Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics in its series Economics Technical Papers with number
989.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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