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Political institutions and debt crises

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  • Caroline Rijckeghem
  • Beatrice Weder

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Suggested Citation

  • Caroline Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, 2009. "Political institutions and debt crises," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 387-408, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:138:y:2009:i:3:p:387-408
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9364-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2003. "Debt Intolerance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 1-74.
    3. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2010. "Sovereign risk: constitutions rule," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 62-85, January.
    4. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    5. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 16(2), pages 151-170, August.
    6. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    7. Aart Kraay & Vikram Nehru, 2006. "When Is External Debt Sustainable?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365.
    8. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    9. Mr. Richard Hemming & Mr. Axel Schimmelpfennig & Mr. Michael Kell, 2003. "Fiscal Vulnerability and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies," IMF Occasional Papers 2003/002, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
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    13. Bussiere, Matthieu & Mulder, Christian, 2000. "Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(4), pages 309-330, October.
    14. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
    15. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    16. Mr. Axel Schimmelpfennig & Nouriel Roubini & Paolo Manasse, 2003. "Predicting Sovereign Debt Crises," IMF Working Papers 2003/221, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    18. Rose, Andrew K., 2005. "One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 189-206, June.
    19. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
    20. Ms. Enrica Detragiache & Mr. Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Crises and Liquidity: Evidence and Interpretation," IMF Working Papers 2001/002, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    22. Kent Osband & Caroline Van Rijckeghem, 2000. "Safety from Currency Crashes," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 47(2), pages 1-4.
    23. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    24. Allers, Maarten & de Haan, Jakob & Sterks, Cees, 2001. "Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 351-363, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt crises; Political institutions; Early warning systems; D27; F30; F34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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