Crisis resolution: next steps
AbstractAt the April 2003 meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committees, it was decided to further encourage the contractual approach to smoothing the process of sovereign debt restructuring by encouraging the more widespread use of collective action clauses (CACs) in international bonds. This decision was shaped partly by Mexico's successful launch of a bond subject to New York law but featuring CACs, and by subsequent issues with similar provisions from other emerging market countries. This paper reviews the developments leading up to that event, its implications, and prospects for the future. It asks whether we can expect to see additional issuance by emerging markets of bonds featuring CACs, whether such a trend would in fact help to make the world a safer financial place, and what additional steps might be taken to further enhance modalities for crisis resolution.
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Date of creation: 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Kenneth Kletzer & Barry J. Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," IMF Working Papers 03/196, International Monetary Fund.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4cj974r4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt4cj974r4, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Barry Eichengreen & Kenneth Kletzer, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," NBER Working Papers 10095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-12-14 (All new papers)
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