'Secret' buy-backs of LDC debt
AbstractWe analyse the buy-back of its debt by an LDC. Contrary to the analyses that were previously done on this subject, we assume that the debtor can hide its transactions behind the veil of a fictitious operator: the banks, we assume, cannot discriminate intra-bank transactions from buy-backs by the debtor itself. With this assumption, the lenders set the price by (rationally) taking account of the country's incentive to repurchase its debt. Will the debtor undertake a buy-back of its debt? The answer is a qualified yes. Large buy-backs will take place. With a continuum of debtors (whose cash constraints are not perfectly known to the banks), the rich debtors will attempt to repurchase as much of their debt as their cash constraint allows them to. This is shown to be Pareto-improving for both the banks and the debtor country.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 39 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552
Other versions of this item:
- Cohen, D. & Verdier, T., 1991. "Secret "Buybacks" of LDC Debt," DELTA Working Papers 91-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Cohen, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry, 1990. "`Secret' Buy-backs of LDC Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 462, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cohen Daniel & Verdier Thierry, 1990. "Secret buy-backs of ldc debt," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9018, CEPREMAP.
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- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008.
"Holdouts In Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory Of Negotiation In A Weak Contractual Environment,"
CAMA Working Papers
2008-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2010. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," NBER Working Papers 16632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marchesi, S., 2000. "Buybacks of Domestic Debt in Public Debt Management," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 573, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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