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Volatility and the Welfare Costs of Financial Market Integration

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  • Pierre-Richard Agenor
  • Joshua Aizenman

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of volatility on the costs and benefits of financial market integration. The basic framework combines the costly state verification model and the contract enforceability approach. The welfare effects of financial market integration are assessed by comparing welfare under financial autarky and financial openness -- under which foreign banks, characterized by lower costs of intermediation and a lower markup rate, have free access to domestic capital markets. The analysis shows that financial integration may be welfare reducing if world interest rates under openness are highly volatile. The basic framework is then extended to consider the case of an upward-sloping domestic supply curve of funds and congestion externalities. It is shown, in particular, that opening the economy to unrestricted inflows of capital may magnify the welfare cost of existing distortions, such as congestion externalities or deposit insurance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6782.

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Date of creation: Nov 1998
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Publication status: published as The Asian Financial Crisis, Agenor, P.R., M. Miller and A. Weber, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 195-225.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6782

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  1. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1997. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 6080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Elhanan Helpman, 1988. "The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps," NBER Working Papers 2771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Working Papers 1894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 1998. "Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability : some international evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1900, The World Bank.
  7. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Claessens, Stijn & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 1998. "How does foreign entry affect the domestic banking market?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1918, The World Bank.
  9. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 1998. "What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals or Market Sentiment?," NBER Working Papers 6408, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Capital Mobility in a Second Best World -- Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 6703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
  12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
  13. Maurice Obstfeld, 1992. "Risk-taking, global diversification, and growth," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 61, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  14. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  15. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Working Papers 0044, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  2. Eduardo Walker & Fernando Lefort, 2002. "Pension Reform And Capital Markets: Are There Any (Hard) Links?," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 5(2), pages 77-149.
  3. Oliver Williams & Stephen Satchell, 2011. "Social welfare issues of financial literacy and their implications for regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 1-40, August.
  4. Agenor, Pierre-Richard, 2001. "Benefits and costs of international financial integration : theory and facts," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2699, The World Bank.
  5. Jorge A. Chan-Lau & Zhaohui Chen, 1998. "Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch as a Result of Inefficient Financial Intermediation—with Reference to the Asian Financial Crisis," International Finance 9804001, EconWPA, revised 24 Apr 1998.
  6. Dimitrios Varvarigos & Keith Blackburn, 2005. "Growth, Uncertainty and Finance," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 12, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.

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