IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2185.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial sector inefficiencies and coordination failures : implications for crisis management

Author

Listed:
  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard
  • Aizenman, Joshua

Abstract

The authors analyze the implications for crisis management of inefficient financial intermediation in a country (such as Indonesia or the Republic of Korea) where firms are highly indebted. They base their analysis on a model in which firms rely on bank credit to finance their working capital needs and loan contracts entail high state verification and enforcement costs for lenders. They find that higher volatility of output, lower productivity, or higher costs for contract enforcement and verification may shift the economy to the inefficient portion of the debt Laffer curve - with potentially sizable losses in employment and output. What implications does this have for the policy debate on crisis management in East Asia? Debt reduction, in addition to debt rescheduling, may be required to reduce employment and output losses in the presence of inefficiencies in the financial sector. In practice this may be difficult to coordinate among a large group of creditors because of the free-riding problem: Each creditor has an incentive to refrain from offering debt relief on its own claims and wait for others to do so, thereby raising the expected value of its own claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 1999. "Financial sector inefficiencies and coordination failures : implications for crisis management," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2185, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2185
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/10/13/000094946_9909250625281/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, December.
    2. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 207-235, June.
    3. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    5. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
    6. Elhanan Helpman, 1989. "Voluntary Debt Reduction: Incentives and Welfare," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 580-611, September.
    7. Helpman, Elhanan, 1989. "The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 440-451, June.
    8. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Garita, Gus & Zhou, Chen, 2009. "Can Financial Openness Help Avoid Currency Crises?," MPRA Paper 23166, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jun 2010.
    2. Amartya Lahiri & Carlos A. Végh, 2007. "Output Costs, Currency Crises and Interest Rate Defence of a Peg," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 216-239, January.
    3. Laeven, Luc & Klingebiel, Daniela & Kroszner, Randy, 2002. "Financial crises, financial dependence, and industry growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2855, The World Bank.
    4. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2000. "Corporate Performance in the East Asian Financial Crisis," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 15(1), pages 23-46, February.
    5. Gus Garita & Chen Zhou, 2009. "Can Open Capital Markets Help Avoid Currency Crises?," DNB Working Papers 205, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Amartya Lahiri & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Living with the Fear of Floating: An Optimal Policy Perspective," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 663-704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Janice Boucher Breuer, 2004. "An Exegesis on Currency and Banking Crises," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 293-320, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Joshua Aizenman, 2005. "Financial sector inefficiencies and the debt Laffer curve," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), pages 1-13.
    2. Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1999. "Financial Sector Inefficiencies and Coordinate Failures: Implications for Crisis Management," NBER Working Papers 7446, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Volatility and the Welfare Costs of Financial Market Integration," NBER Working Papers 6782, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2002. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 107-132, January.
    5. Aizenman, Joshua & Powell, Andrew, 2003. "Volatility and financial intermediation," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 657-679, October.
    6. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    7. Disyatat, Piti, 2004. "Currency crises and the real economy: The role of banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 75-90, February.
    8. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Peter J. Montiel, 2006. "Credit Market Imperfections and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Part I: Fixed Exchange Rates," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 76, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4089 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. AGENOR Pierre-Richard & IZQUIERDO Alejandro & FOFACK Hippolyte, 2010. "IMMPA: A Quantitative Macroeconomic Framework for the Analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategies," EcoMod2003 330700003, EcoMod.
    11. Joshua Aizenman & Nancy P. Marion, 1999. "Uncertainty and the disappearance of international credit," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
    12. Joshua Aizenman, 2003. "Capital Mobility In A Second–Best World: Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 1-17, February.
    13. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 2006. "Investment and deposit contracts under costly intermediation and aggregate volatility," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 263-275.
    14. Strand, Jon, 1995. "Lending terms, debt concessions, and developing countries' resource extraction," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 99-117, August.
    15. Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    16. Mr. Philip R. Lane & Mr. Gian M Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "External Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 2000/152, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Ana-Maria Fuertes & Elena Kalotychou, 2004. "Forecasting sovereign default using panel models: A comparative analysis," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 228, Society for Computational Economics.
    18. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    19. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 139-182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Ahmet Faruk Aysan, 2006. "The Effects of Volatility on Growth and Financial Development through Capital Market Imperfections," Working Papers 2006/12, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    21. Vincent Bouvatier, 2007. "Are International Interest Rate Differentials Driven by the Risk Premium? The Case of Asian Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(6), pages 1-14.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic Debt Management; Financial Intermediation; Banks&Banking Reform; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.