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Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?

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Author Info
Joshua Aizenman (University of California, Santa Cruz and NBER)
Stephen J. Turnovsky (University of Washington)

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Abstract

This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side. The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications discussed. More generous bailouts, financed by the high-income block, encourage borrowing and increase the probability of default. The optimal reserve requirements for both lender and borrower are characterised. The introduction of a reserve requirement in either country reduces the default risk and raises the welfare of both the high-income and the emerging-market economies. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 476 (January)
Pages: 107-132
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:476:p:107-132

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 1998. "Volatility and the welfare costs of financial market integration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1974, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Working Papers 1894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jose De Gregorio & Sebastian Edwards & Rodrigo O. Valdes, 2000. "Controls on Capital Inflows: Do they Work?," NBER Working Papers 7645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Helpman, Elhanan, 1989. "The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 440-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael P. Dooley, 1997. "A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. McKinnon, Ronald I., 1982. "The order of economic liberalization: Lessons from Chile and Argentina," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 159-186, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 1999. "Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CSGR Working papers series 35/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
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  12. Aizenman, Joshua, 1989. "Country Risk, Incomplete Information and Taxes on International Borrowing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 147-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ricardo Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 1998. "Emerging Market Crises: An Asset Markets Perspective," Working papers 98-18, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  14. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, . "A Quality and Risk-Adjusted Cost Function for Banks: Evidence on the "Too-Big-To-Fail" Doctrine," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 25-92, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephen J. Turnovsky & Santanu Chatterjee, 2004. "Tied Versus Untied Foreign Aid: Consequences for a Growing Economy," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 8, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joshua Aizenman, 2005. "Ex Ante Carrots instead of Ex Post Sticks: Two Examples," NBER Working Papers 11242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rangan Gupta, 2004. "Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements," Working papers 2004-33, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
  4. Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, 1999. "Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of International Credit," NBER Working Papers 7202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Theo S Eicher & Uwe Walz & Stephen Turnovsky, 2000. "Financial Liberalization and Capital Flow Reversals:," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0003, Department of Economics at the University of Washington. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eza Al-Zein, 2008. "Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs," IMF Working Papers 08/108, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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