Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Capital Mobility in a Second Best World -- Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joshua Aizenman

Abstract

This paper studies the welfare effects of financial integration in the presence of moral hazard. Entrepreneurs face a trade off between risk and return. Banks may mitigate the resultant excessive risk by costly monitoring, where greater risk reduction requires more resources devoted to risk supervision. Hence, the excessive risk associated with moral hazard is endogenously determined. We show that a drop in banks' cost of funds increases the risk tolerated by banks in a competitive equilibrium. Similarly, less efficient intermediation technology (i.e. more costly risk monitoring), higher macroeconomic volatility, and a more generous deposit insurance all raise the riskiness of projects in a competitive equilibrium. Overborrowing would arise e insurance in circumstances where the cost of financial intermediation is relatively high, the banks' cost of funds is relatively low, and macroeconomic volatility is high. With relative scarcity of funds, financial integration is welfare reducing (enhancing) if the financial intermediation is relatively inefficient (efficient). The association between financial integration and welfare may be non-monotonic. For a large enough cost of financial intermediation, the dependence of welfare on the banks' cost of funds has an inverted U shape. For such an economy, financial integration and reforming the banking sector are complimentary policies, as the gain of each reform is magnified by the second. If one starts with a highly inefficient banking system, reforming it and improving its operation is a precondition for s

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w6703.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6703.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Joshua Aizenman, 2003. "Capital Mobility In A Second--Best World: Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 1-17, February.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6703

Note: IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 207-235, June.
  2. Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger, 1996. "Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, NBER-EASE Volume 5," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ito_96-1, May.
  3. Edwards, Sebastian & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1986. "The Welfare Effects of Trade and Capital Market Liberalization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 141-48, February.
  4. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888 Elsevier.
  5. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  7. Edwards, Sebastian & Vegh, Carlos A., 1997. "Banks and macroeconomic disturbances under predetermined exchange rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 239-278, October.
  8. Michael P. Dooley, 1998. "A model of crises in emerging markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 630, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
  10. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Buch, Claudia M. & Golder, Stefan M., 2001. "Foreign versus domestic banks in Germany and the US: a tale of two markets?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(4-5), pages 341-361, December.
  2. Claudia M. Buch, 2000. "Capital Market Integration in Euroland: The Role of Banks," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 443-464, November.
  3. Claudia M. Buch, 2001. "Financial Market Integration in a Monetary Union," Kiel Working Papers 1062, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Cécile Bastidon, 2002. "Financement extérieur des Pays en Développement : une revue de la littérature des modèles de dette et de crises financières," Post-Print hal-00730937, HAL.
  5. Claudia M. Buch, 2000. "Financial Market Integration in the US: Lessons for Europe?," Kiel Working Papers 1004, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  6. Claudia M. Buch, 2001. "Cross-Border Banking and Transmission Mechanisms: The Case of Europe," Kiel Working Papers 1063, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  7. Dominic Wilson, 2001. "Managing Capital Flows: A Distortions Approach," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 312, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  8. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 1998. "Volatility and the welfare costs of financial market integration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1974, The World Bank.
  9. Buch, Claudia M., 1999. "Chilean-type capital controls: A building block of the new international financial architecture?," Kiel Discussion Papers 350, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  10. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne, 1999. "UDROP: A Small Contribution to the New International Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Claudia M. Buch & Stefan M. Golder, 2000. "Foreign competition and disintermediation: no threat to the German banking system?," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 53(213), pages 107-133.
  12. Claudia M. Buch & Stefan M. Golder, 2000. "Foreign competition and disintermediation: no threat to the German banking system?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 53(213), pages 107-133.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.