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Financement extérieur des Pays en Développement : une revue de la littérature des modèles de dette et de crises financières

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Author Info

  • Cécile Bastidon

    ()
    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - Université Sud Toulon Var)

Abstract

Notre objet est d'établir, concernant le financement extérieur d'emprunteurs souverains confrontés à un rationnement du crédit, les bases d'un cadre d'analyse moins restrictif que celui des modèles de dette souveraine. Dans ces modèles, le défaut ne dépend, en effet, que de la décision du seul emprunteur, en conséquence de la maximisation de son utilité intertemporelle. Il s'agit, ici, de dégager de la littérature récente sur les crises financières les déterminants d'un défaut ne résultant pas directement d'un tel choix. Les principaux éléments concernent les caractéristiques de l'emprunteur, c'est-à-dire les paramètres de solvabilité, et de structuration ainsi que de fonctionnement du système de financement domestique. Enfin, le défaut est envisagé comme une des conséquences du comportement d'aléa moral des prêteurs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00730937.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2002
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Publication status: Published, Région et Développement, 2002, 15, 147-165
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00730937

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00730937
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Related research

Keywords: dette souveraine et crises de dette ; asymétries d'information;

References

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  1. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976. "Optimal Financial Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania 97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Walter B. Wriston, 1998. "Dumb Networks and Smart Capital," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), Winter.
  3. Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Capital Mobility in a Second Best World -- Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 6703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Joshua Aizenman & Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann, 2001. "Optimal tax and debt policy with endogenously imperfect creditworthiness," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(4), pages 367-395.
  5. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
  6. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Robert P. Flood, 1992. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(2), pages 357-394, June.
  7. Thierry D. Buchs, 1999. "Financial crisis in the Russian Federation: Are the Russians learning to tango?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(3), pages 687-715, November.
  8. Cécile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles, 2001. "Prêteur en dernier ressort et statut de "too big to fail" d'un emprunteur souverain : le "jeu de faux semblants" appliqué à la crise russe," Post-Print, HAL hal-00730929, HAL.
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Cited by:
  1. Marie-Sophie Gauvin, 2010. "La relation liquidité-prix d'actifs comme complément au principe de sélectivité du renflouement par un prêteur en dernier ressort," Post-Print, HAL dumas-00563416, HAL.

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