This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A model of seller holdout

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Flavio Menezes ()
Rohan Pitchford

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the order in which they negotiate is endogenous. Holdout occurs if at least one of the sellers is not present in the first round of negotiations. We demonstrate that complementarity of the buyer’s technology is a necessary condition for equilibrium holdout. Moreover, a rise in complementarity leads to an increased likelihood of holdout, and an increased efficiency loss. Applications include patents, the land assembly problem, and mergers. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0432-x
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 231-253
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:231-253

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Bargaining model; Delay; Complementarity; Holdout.;

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Steven Shavell, 2007. "Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation," NBER Working Papers 13564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," MPRA Paper 17606, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008. "Holdouts In Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory Of Negotiation In A Weak Contractual Environment," CAMA Working Papers 2008-37, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities," Working papers 2009-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kurtis Swope, Pamela Schmitt, John Cadigan and Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.