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Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?

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  • Sayantan Ghosal
  • Kannika Thampanishvong

    ()

Abstract

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of creditors, we derive an optimal CAC threshold and (ii) given a fixed CAC threshold, as the number of creditors becomes larger, we show a convergence to efficient information aggregation. Moreover, strengthening CACs may actually increase the ex ante probability of adverse shock. Our analysis makes the case for a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis in its series CDMA Working Paper Series with number 200711.

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Date of creation: 15 Jun 2007
Date of revision: 15 Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:san:cdmawp:0711

Note: This paper was previously circulated with the title ‘Bargaining, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Debt Crisis’.
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Keywords: Sovereign Debt; Bargaining; Coordination; Moral Hazard; Collective Action Clauses.;

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Cited by:
  1. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2010. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," NBER Working Papers 16632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bardozzetti, Alfredo & Dottori, Davide, 2014. "Collective action clauses: How do they affect sovereign bond yields?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 286-303.
  3. Karel Janda, 2009. "Bankruptcies With Soft Budget Constraint," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 430-460, 07.
  4. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2010. "Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-100, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  5. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  6. Alfredo Bardozzetti & Davide Dottori, 2013. "Collective action clauses: how do they weigh on sovereigns?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 897, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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