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Jeux de négociation dans les affaires antitrust : engagements et transaction

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Author Info

  • Patrice Bougette

    ()
    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)

  • Christian Montet

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpellierain d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR5474 - INRA : UR1135 - CIHEAM - Université Montpellier I - Montpellier SupAgro)

  • Florent Venayre

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpellierain d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR5474 - INRA : UR1135 - CIHEAM - Université Montpellier I - Montpellier SupAgro)

Abstract

À l'instar des États-Unis, l'apparition, en France, d'un droit négocié doit conduire à une meilleure allocation des ressources rares de l'autorité, ce qui accroît indéniablement l'efficacité économique. Cependant, la théorie microéconomique - en particulier dans ses applications de la théorie des jeux - démontre que les résultats à attendre des nouvelles procédures dépendent fortement du cadre institutionnel et des protocoles de négociation. La procédure française dite de transaction constitue une parfaite illustration des difficultés à créer un mécanisme incitatif attractif pour les deux parties. Enfin, au-delà des chances de succès de la procédure, son avantage social est susceptible d'être remis en cause. Certes, si l'autorité, dans un souci d'intérêt général, a trouvé avantageux de souscrire à la transaction, on pourrait en attendre un avantage en bien-être. Cependant, les pièges sont nombreux et si l'on veut s'assurer des chances d'efficacité économique de la procédure, il convient encore d'en apprécier les effets incitatifs au-delà du seul jeu étroit de la négociation. Des effets pervers importants sont aisément envisageables selon le cadre général dans lequel s'inscrivent ces procédures.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00476774.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published, Concurrence et consommation, 2006, 146, 50-56
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00476774

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00476774/en/
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Related research

Keywords: Procédure de transaction ; Loi NRE ; Bargaining ; Théorie des jeux;

References

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  1. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
  2. Hugh C. Briggs III & Kathleen D. Huryn & Mark E. McBride, 1996. "Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 770-786, Winter.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0520, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0508, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  6. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
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Cited by:
  1. Florent Venayre, 2013. "Rappel de la loi républicaine sur la concurrence pour Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon : Une nouvelle volonté politique pour les économies ultramarines," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00865120, HAL.

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