Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial
AbstractGiven the costs of litigation and the availability of pretrial discovery, the question arises why some cases fail to settle at any time in the pretrial period. To examine this problem, the article develops a model of litigation and settlement in which the efforts the parties invest in the case (1) partly determine the strength of the plaintiff's claim and (2) are partly shielded from disclosure. The parties pursue mixed strategies in equilibrium, preventing settlement in a positive fraction of cases. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Doornik, Katherine, 2014. "A rationale for mediation and its optimal use," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-10.
- Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008.
"Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening,"
2008-16, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening," CESifo Working Paper Series 2334, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stéphane TREBUCQ, 2005. "L'actionnaire minoritaire, le commissaire, l'avocat et le juge : histoire d'une fusion litigieuse," Economic History 0503021, EconWPA.
- Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
- Osborne, Evan, 1999. "Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 399-409, September.
- Heaton, J.B., 2005. "Settlement Pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 264-275, June.
- repec:fth:prinin:364 is not listed on IDEAS
- Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," NBER Working Papers 5649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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