The case of a French merger can be used to better understand the nature of conflicts of interest and cognitive conflicts between accountants, shareholders, lawyers and judges. This is especially the case when exchange ratios are unfairly established. When caught in a situation of asymmetrical information, minority shareholders try to obtain more information about the auditors' report through a trial. The financial knowledge possessed by the judge then becomes a necessary condition if shareholders are to be protected.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Economic History with number
0503021.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 24 Mar 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpeh:0503021
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24. in « L’entreprise, le chiffre et le droit », éditeurs J.G. Degos et S. Trébucq, Bordeaux (2005), pp. 385-407. Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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