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Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer

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Author Info
Lucian Arye Bebchuk

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Abstract

In many disputes, the expected value to the plaintiff from going to trial is negative, either because the chances of winning are small or because the litigation costs are large. While such a plaintiff would not go to trial, he might sue in the hope of extracting a settlement offer: the defendant might make such an offer if he is uncertain as to whether or not the expected value to the plaintiff of going to trial is negative. This paper seeks to identify the factors that determine: (i) whether a plaintiff who does not intend to go to trial will nonetheless succeed in extracting an offer; and (ii) how much will such a plaintiff succeed in extracting.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2161.

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Date of creation: Jan 1987
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2161

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Salant, Stephen W., 1984. "Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants," Working Papers 516, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Omri Ben-Shahar, 1999. "The Cost of Compensation: Revisiting Contract Remedies in Repeat Play Settings," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1124, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Negative Expected Value Suits," NBER Working Papers 6474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, 1994. "An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On FrivolousSuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11," NBER Working Papers 4731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Álvaro Bustos & Ronen Avraham., 2008. "The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages," Documentos de Trabajo 353, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Working Papers of BETA 2006-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Pao-Li Chang, 2002. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism," Working Papers 475, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan. [Downloadable!]
  8. Josh Lerner, 2008. "The Litigation of Financial Innovations," NBER Working Papers 14324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Omri Ben-Shahar, 1999. "Rights Eroding by Past Breach," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1001, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2003. "Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-27, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Pao-Li Chang, 2007. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute," Working Papers 21-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Daniela Marchesi, 2007. "The Rule Incentives that Rule Civil Justice," ISAE Working Papers 85, ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses - (Rome, ITALY). [Downloadable!]
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