The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
AbstractThis paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel judgement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Trade Working Papers with number 22062.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
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Dispute Settlement; legal controversy; block; appeal; two-sided asymmetric information; political cost;
Other versions of this item:
- Pao-Li Chang, 2002. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism," Working Papers 475, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C & Nordström, Håkan, 1999. "Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, 2006. "WTO Dispute Settlement from 1995 to 2005 -- A Statistical Analysis," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 219-231, March.
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04-2004, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2006. "Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 133-163, September.
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