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Negative Expected Value Suits

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Author Info
Lucian Arye Bebchuk

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Abstract

When the cost of a suit exceeds the expected judgment, will a potential plaintiff be able to extract any amount in settlement from the defendant? If so, what is the source of the plaintiff's ability to extract a settlement? This essay discusses existing theories as to why (and when) plaintiffs with negative-expected-value (NEV) suits can extract a settlement amount from the defendant. Among the theories discussed are ones that focus on informational issues and ones that focus on the way in which the parties' litigation costs are expected to be distributed over time.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6474.

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Date of creation: Mar 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6474

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Miceli, Thomas J., 1993. "Optimal deterrence of nuisance suits by repeat defendants," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 135-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Landes, William M, 1993. "Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 99-134, January.
  5. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1988. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 437-50, June.
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  8. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1996. "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
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  1. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1072, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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