AbstractWe provide a simple incomplete-information model wherein an initially uninformed plaintiff makes a menu of settlement demands (one of which involves confidentiality) of the informed defendant. The defendant is informed about both his culpability in the harm suffered by the current plaintiff and the existence of other plaintiffs. The possibility that there are other plaintiffs the defendant might face improves the current plaintiff's bargaining position, as the likelihood of follow-on suits depends upon the visibility of the outcome of the case. For this reason, the defendant may be willing to be "hush money."
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007.
"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
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- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004.
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- Kaplan, David S. & Sadka, Joyce & Silva-Mendez, Jorge Luis, 2007.
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4434, The World Bank.
- Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Keith Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, 2013. "Injunctive and reverse settlements in competition-blocking litigation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 243-269, October.
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