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Hush Money

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Author Info
Andrew F. Daughety
Jennifer F. Reinganum

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Abstract

We provide a simple incomplete-information model wherein an initially uninformed plaintiff makes a menu of settlement demands (one of which involves confidentiality) of the informed defendant. The defendant is informed about both his culpability in the harm suffered by the current plaintiff and the existence of other plaintiffs. The possibility that there are other plaintiffs the defendant might face improves the current plaintiff's bargaining position, as the likelihood of follow-on suits depends upon the visibility of the outcome of the case. For this reason, the defendant may be willing to be "hush money."

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199924%2930%3A4%3C661%3AHM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 661-678
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:winter:p:661-678

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Web page: http://www.rje.org

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  1. repec:bep:thetop:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1117-1117 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Kathryn Spier & Xinyu Hua, . "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1081, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003. "Secrecy and Safety," Working Papers 0317, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kathryn Spier, 2001. "The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1024, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Working Papers 0417, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2002. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining," Working Papers 0221, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Oct 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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