Legal advice about acts already committed
AbstractMuch legal advice is provided after individuals have committed acts -- when they come before a tribunal -- rather than at the time they decide how to act. This paper considers the effects and social desirability of such legal advice. It is emphasized that 1egl advice tends to reduce expected sanctions, which may encourage acts subject to sanctions. There is, however, no a priort basis for believing that this is socially undesirable, because, among other reasons, it may be possible to raise the level of sanctions to offset their dilution due to legal advice. In addition, legal advice has no general tendency to improve the effectiveness of the legal system through its influence on the information presented to tribunals.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shavell, Steven, 1988. "Legal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 123-50, January.
- Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006.
"Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2007. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 627-656, December.
- Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, 2002.
"Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(3), pages 366-379, July.
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