Corporatism or Competition?
AbstractThe authors present important research showing that corporatist institutions generate smaller non-competitive wage differentials than a decentralized system. A theoretical explanation is developed based on the hold-up problem in investments, arguing that corporatist institutions solve the problem by specifying ex ante nominal contracts that remove the necessity of ex post bargaining over the surplus of an employment relationship. The authors also argue that such institutions allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate aggregate shocks, even more so than decentralized systems. Corporatism or Competition? is the first book to bring together the mass of research on comparative wage differences, wage movements and employment behaviour in different countries with different institutional frameworks, in an organized and coherent fashion.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521049399 and published in 2008.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.cambridge.org
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ruth Austin).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.