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Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform

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  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio Lopez-deSilanes
  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Robert W. Vishny

Abstract

Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7428.

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Date of creation: Dec 1999
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Publication status: published as (Published as "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance) Journal of Financial Economics (October 2000).
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7428

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