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An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining

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  • Ochs, Jack
  • Roth, Alvin E

Abstract

In a study of alternating offer bargaining with discounting, perfect equilibrium was found to have little predictive power under the conventional assumption that bargainers' utility is measured by their monetary payoffs. Instead, the authors' data exhibit a first mover advantage, independent of the equilibrium prediction. However the pattern of rejected offers and counterproposals shows bargainers' utility was not measured by their monetary payoffs. The authors also reanalyze data from earlier experiments, finding a similar pattern of rejections and counterproposals. This suggests that uncontrolled nonmonetary components of utility may have played a role in those experiments also, offering a possible explanation for the mutually inconsistent conclusions reached. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-384, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:3:p:355-84
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 285-300, October.
    3. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Malouf, Michael W. K. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1981. "Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 153-177, June.
    5. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    6. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
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