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A way to play bankruptcy problems

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  • Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel

Abstract

The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

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Paper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/169781.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/169781

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Keywords: Fallida; Jocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia;

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  1. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza & María del Carmen Marco, 1995. "A Mechanism For Meta-Bargaining Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1995-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  3. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  4. Gadea-Blanco, Pedro & Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel & Marco-Gil, María del Carmen, 2013. "Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way," Working Papers, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics 2072/220217, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  5. Kristof Bosmans & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Lorenz comparisons of nine rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën ces0705, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  6. Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel & Marco Gil, M. Carmen, 2012. "A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics 2072/182719, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  7. J. Arin, 2007. "Egalitarian Distributions In Coalitional Models," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 47-57.
  8. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  9. Dagan, N. & Serrano, R. & Volij, O., 1994. "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-11, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Ignacio García-Jurado & Julio González-Díaz & Antonio Villar, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 189-197, September.
  11. Antonio Villar Notario & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 2000. "The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions To Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2000-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Cowell, F.A., 2000. "Measurement of inequality," Handbook of Income Distribution, Elsevier, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 87-166 Elsevier.
  13. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
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