Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem

Author Info

M. Angeles de Frutos () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de EconomÎa, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe , Spain)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Maria-Angeles de Frutos

Abstract

In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 255-272
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272

Note: Received: 24 February 1998 / accepted: 9 March 1999
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Networks," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200410, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 563, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.