This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Even Allocations For Generalised Rationing Problems

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marco Mariotti (Royal Holloway)
Abstract

We study an extension of the standard rationing problem, consisting of the allocation of utility losses. We assume neither linearly transferable utilities nor risk averse agents. As a consequence, the utility possibility sets need not be convex or smooth. This problem is referred to as the generalised rationing problem. We introduce the notion of even allocations as a solution concept that extends the random arrival rule to this general scenario. Moreover, we show that, when the feasible set is convex, this solution can be characterised by a suitable reformulation of the axioms that define the Nash bargaining solution.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2003-10.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2003-10.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

Related research
Keywords: Rationing Problems; Non-Transferable Utilities; Nash Bargaining Solution; Clarke Cones.;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Lin Zhou, 1997. "The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 681-686, May.
  6. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993. "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116.
  11. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Herrero, Carmen & Maschler, Michael & Villar, Antonio, 1999. "Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-77, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Roth, Alvin E., 1977. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Thomson, William, 1981. "A class of solutions to bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 431-441, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.