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Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings

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  • Vincenzo Denicolò
  • Marco Mariotti

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  • Vincenzo Denicolò & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 351-358, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:48:y:2000:i:4:p:351-358
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005278100070
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lin Zhou, 1997. "The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 681-686, May.
    2. Alvin E. Roth, 1977. "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 64-65, February.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December.
    5. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 66-70.
    2. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 7-41, November.
    3. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
    4. Marco Mariotti, 2003. "Even Allocations For Generalised Rationing Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Shuzhong Shi & Guofu Tan, 2015. "Nash bargaining for log-convex problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 413-440, April.
    6. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    7. Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for general budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-145, January.
    8. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    9. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2016. "‘Vintage’ Nash bargaining without convexity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 32-34.
    10. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2006. "Two-stage Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 572, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2012. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 851-884, November.
    12. Katsuhide Fujita & Takayuki Ito & Mark Klein, 2012. "A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 29-47, January.
    13. Michele Lombardi & Marco Mariotti, 2009. "Uncovered bargaining solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 601-610, November.

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