Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
AbstractNash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 12 July 1996 / Accepted: 6 February 1997
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