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Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem

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  • Roth, Alvin E.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 16 (1977)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 247-251

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:16:y:1977:i:2:p:247-251

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. Aase, Knut K., 2008. "The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  2. Emililo Calvo, 2004. "Single NTU-value solutions," Game Theory and Information 0405004, EconWPA, revised 10 Jun 2004.
  3. Naeve-Steinweg, E., 2004. "The averaging mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 410-424, February.
  4. Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2009. "Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria," CSEF Working Papers 235, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  5. Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
  6. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119.
  7. Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, EconWPA, revised 01 Oct 1996.
  8. Yan-An Hwang, 2013. "On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 339-355, May.
  9. del Carmen Marco Gil, M., 1995. "Efficient solutions for bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 57-69, August.
  10. repec:phd:pjdevt:pjd_2006_vol._xxxiii_nos._1and2-f is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Özgür Kıbrıs, 2012. "Nash bargaining in ordinal environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 269-282, December.
  12. Marco Mariotti, 2003. "Even Allocations For Generalised Rationing Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  13. Kroll, Eike Benjamin & Vogt, Bodo, 2012. "The relevance of irrelevant alternatives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 435-437.

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