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Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems

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Author Info
Nir Dagan
Oscar Volij

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Abstract

We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 004.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:004

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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

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  1. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 2005. "A Comparison Of The Average Prekernel And The Prekernel," Economics Working Papers we055827, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  3. William Thomson, 2006. "On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims: A Constructive Geometric Approach," RCER Working Papers 528, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2004. "A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers 511, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
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  5. William Thomson, 2006. "The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof," RCER Working Papers 529, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
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