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Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

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  • Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.

Abstract

Abstract We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 29-36

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:29-36

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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Keywords: Voting Taxes Majority Single-Crossing Talmud;

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Cited by:
  1. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.

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