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The political economy of derived pension rights

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  • M.-L. Leroux

    ()

  • P. Pestieau

Abstract

Derived pension rights (including survivor benefits and spousal compensations for one-earner couples) exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from a political economy process when Social Security is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgean pillars. We find that the pension system should be contributive but with a positive level of derived rights. We also show that such a system encourages stay-at-home wives, thus revealing an unpleasant trade-off between female labor participation and poverty alleviation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 753-776

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:19:y:2012:i:5:p:753-776

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

Related research

Keywords: Social Security; Derived pension rights; Majority voting; Individualization of pension rights; D72; D78; H55;

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References

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  1. Mathieu Lefèbvre & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "The generosity of the welfare state towards the elderly," Empirica, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 351-360, December.
  2. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1449, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  4. Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 259, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Zhenchao Qian, 1998. "Changes in assortative mating: The impact of age and education, 1970–1890," Demography, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 279-292, August.
  6. Grégory de Walque, 2004. "Voting on pensions: a survey," Working Paper Research 62, National Bank of Belgium.
  7. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-29, May.
  8. Richard V. Burkhauser & Philip Giles & Dean R. Lillard & Johannes Schwarze, 2005. "Until Death Do Us Part: An Analysis of the Economic Well-Being of Widows in Four Countries," Journals of Gerontology: Series B, Gerontological Society of America, vol. 60(5), pages S238-S246.
  9. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
  10. Winfried Pohlmeier & Luc Bauwens & David Veredas, 2007. "High frequency financial econometrics. Recent developments," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136223, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Working Papers 2007-07, FEDEA.
  12. Carole Bonnet & Marco Geraci, 2009. "Correcting gender inequality in pensions. The experience of five European countries," Population and Societies 453, Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED).
  13. LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, . "Voting on pensions: sex and marriage," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2308, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  15. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Voting on pensions with endogenous retirement age," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1754, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2010. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521681599.
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Cited by:
  1. LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, 2009. "Voting on pensions : sex and marriage," CORE Discussion Papers 2009057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-32-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Jan 2013.

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