Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
AbstractThis article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in- divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010079.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2010
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stability; fairness; membership; coalition formation;
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Le Breton & Juan Moreno-Ternero & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2013. "Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 673-694, August.
- Le Breton, Michel & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2012. "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership," TSE Working Papers 12-300, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Le Breton, Michel & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2012. "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership," IDEI Working Papers 715, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Michel Le Breton & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2010. "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership," Working Papers 10.16, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Michel Le Breton & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2010. "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership," Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2011-02-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2011-02-12 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2011-02-12 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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