Jens Leth Hougaard () (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark.) Lars Thorlund-Petersen (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiskberg, DENMARK) Bezalel Peleg (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Center Rationality, Interaction, Decision Theory, Givat-Ram, Feldman Building, 91 904 Jerusalem, ISRAEL)
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This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper consideres alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.
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