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On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game


Author Info

  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark.)

  • Lars Thorlund-Petersen

    (Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiskberg, DENMARK)

  • Bezalel Peleg

    (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Center Rationality, Interaction, Decision Theory, Givat-Ram, Feldman Building, 91 904 Jerusalem, ISRAEL)


This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper consideres alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 147-165

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:147-165

Note: Received: February 1999/Final version: June 2001
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Keywords: Balanced games · the core · Lorenz-maximal imputations.;


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Cited by:
  1. Vincent Iehlé, 2014. "The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core," Working Papers halshs-00846826, HAL.
  2. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper 2004-110, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Branzei,R. & Dimitrov,D. & Tijs,S., 2002. "Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games," Working Papers 337, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Peter Knudsen & Lars Østerdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
  5. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2012. "An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution," Working Papers 2072/203157, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  6. Le Breton, Michel & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2012. "Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership," IDEI Working Papers 715, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
  8. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia, 2014. "On reduced games and the lexmax solution," Working Papers 2072/237591, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  9. Brânzei, R. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2007. "Egalitarianism in Multi-Choice Games," Discussion Paper 2007-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Javier Arin & Jeroen Kuipers & Dries Vermeulen, 2008. "An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 565-580, December.
  11. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 2007. "Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(7-8), pages 855-870, September.
  12. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella, 2008. "A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations," Working Papers 327, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.


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