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The Proportional Random Allocation of Indivisible Units

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  • Moulin, Herve

    (Rice U)

Abstract

Indivisible units are randomly allocated among agents with a claim/demand on the resources. The available resources fall short of the sum of individual claims. The proportional method distributes units sequentially, and the probability of receiving a unit at any step is proportional to the unsatisfied claims. We characterize the family of probabilistic rationing methods meeting the three axioms Consistency, Lower and Upper Composition. It contains the proportional method, all deterministic fixed priority methods, and the priority compositions of proportional methods. The proportional method is the only fair method in the family.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Rice University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000-02.

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Date of creation: Nov 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-02

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  1. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  2. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  3. Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March.
  4. Wang, YunTong, 1999. "The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 187-192, August.
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 98-99, August.
  6. Carmen Herrero Blanco, 1998. "- Minimal Rights In Claims Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1998-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  8. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  9. Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  10. Nouweland, C.G.A.M.. van den & Potters, J. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 1991. "Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 478, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
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