A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems
AbstractWe consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems. We show that in a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard Business School in its series Harvard Business School Working Papers with number 09-069.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Bankruptcy/estate division problems; claims monotonicity; direct revelation claim game; equal division; equal treatment of equals; Nash equilibria; nonbossiness; (weak) order preservation.;
Other versions of this item:
- Ashlagi, Itai & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Klaus, Bettina, 2012. "A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 228-233.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-12-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-12-01 (Microeconomics)
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