Fairness and Efficiency in a Subjective Claims Problem
AbstractIn a subjective claims problem several agents have contributed to the production of a cake which is to be divided among them. Since contributions are difficult to compare and the production function is nonlinear, agents'subjective evaluations of claims are likely to be conflicting. In a large-scale experimental study we compare the performance of three mechanisms which use agents' reports to resolve the subjective claims problem. The mechanisms differ with respect to the information they process, and they are compared in terms of efficiency and perceived allocative and procedural fairness.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2013-30.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
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More information through EDIRC
Fair Division; Subjective Claims; Experiment; Mechanisms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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