Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Fairness and Efficiency in a Subjective Claims Problem

Contents:

Author Info

  • Anita Gantner

    ()

  • Rudolf Kerschbamer

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In a subjective claims problem several agents have contributed to the production of a cake which is to be divided among them. Since contributions are difficult to compare and the production function is nonlinear, agents'subjective evaluations of claims are likely to be conflicting. In a large-scale experimental study we compare the performance of three mechanisms which use agents' reports to resolve the subjective claims problem. The mechanisms differ with respect to the information they process, and they are compared in terms of efficiency and perceived allocative and procedural fairness.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2013-30.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2013-30.

    as in new window
    Length: 41 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-30

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Universitätsstraße 15, A - 6020 Innsbruck
    Phone: 0512/507-7151
    Fax: 0512/507-2788
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.uibk.ac.at/fakultaeten/volkswirtschaft_und_statistik/index.html.en
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Fair Division; Subjective Claims; Experiment; Mechanisms;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. James Konow, 2000. "Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1072-1091, September.
    2. Karagozoglu Emin & Riedl Arno, 2010. "Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining," Research Memorandum 042, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Alexander W. Cappelen & Astri D. Hole & Erik Ø. Sørensen & Bertil Tungodden, 2005. "The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 1611, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1491-1510, November.
    5. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Moulin, Herve & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2008. "Impartial division of a dollar," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 176-191, March.
    6. Schokkaert, Erik & Lagrou, Leo, 1983. "An empirical approach to distributive justice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 33-52, June.
    7. James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
    8. Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Robert Shupp, 2008. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Departmental Working Papers 21, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    9. Pär Torstensson, 2009. "AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(01), pages 111-115.
    10. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, 2004. "Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-044/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    12. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
    13. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
    14. Burrows, Paul & Loomes, Graham, 1994. "The Impact of Fairness on Bargaining Behaviour," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 201-21.
    15. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    16. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
    17. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    18. T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2008. "Paying the partners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 19-37, July.
    19. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Janette Walde).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.