The Arctic scramble: Introducing claims in a contest model
AbstractIn this paper I integrate elements from the bankruptcy literature in a resource contest model. In a contest model, agents fight over a contested resource and their investment in 'guns' determines how much of the resource is secured by each agent. In a bankruptcy problem, agents claim a share of a contested resource, and their claims determine the allocation to each agent. The integrated model of this paper allows the combination of guns and claims to jointly determine the distribution of a contested resource. The relevance of such a model is motivated using the Arctic scramble as a leading example. This contest over the Arctic's oil and gas reserves involves the five coastal Arctic countries, each with its own distinct territorial claim. I propose four contest-bankruptcy rules that integrate the most common contest success function with four classical bankruptcy rules. These four rules are assessed and effects of integrating claims and guns in one rule are analysed for a resource contest model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Contest model; Bankruptcy problem; Conflict; Claims; Arctic scramble;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
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