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Why Is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory of Asymmetry and Claim Priority Based on Influence Costs

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Author Info
Welch, Ivo

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Abstract

This theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior, consistent with the presence of conflict lawyers) and absolute priority violations in financial distress: better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior. Because "deterrence can reduce creditors' total expenses in a priority contest, the ex post stronger lobbyist/litigant should be senior ex ante. For equivalent reasons, the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and/or implicit contracts, and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule (APR). This article further shows that Chapter HI creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 1203-36
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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:10:y:1997:i:4:p:1203-36

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  2. Schuhmacher, Joachim, 1998. "Seniority Structure and Financial Intermediation," Discussion Paper Serie A 583, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. TSURUTA Daisuke, 2007. "Credit Contagion and Trade Credit Supply: Evidence from Small Business Data in Japan," Discussion papers 07043, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  5. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0510001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Adriana Breccia, 2004. "Formal Bankruptcy: Strategic Debt Service with Senior and Junior Creditors," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0411, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jandik, Tomas & Makhija, Anil K., 2005. "The Impact of the Structure of Debt on Target Gains," Working Paper Series 2005-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Douglas O. Cook & Lewis J. Spellman, 2006. "Loan rates vs. public debt rates: do loan rates reflect special values to the borrower or information intensive lending?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pages 325-348. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Documents de Travail 91, Banque de France. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jong, A. de, 2004. "It Takes Two To Tango: an empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting banks," Research Paper ERS-2004-049-F&A Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  11. Massimo Omiccioli, 2005. "Trade Credit as Collateral," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 553, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2004. "The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04021, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
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  13. TSURUTA Daisuke & Peng XU, 2007. "Debt Structure and Bankruptcy of Financially Distressed Small Businesses," Discussion papers 07032, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  14. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0510003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Filippo Ippolito, 2005. "Convertible Preferred Stock in Venture Capital Financing," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe12, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stanley D. Longhofer & João A.C. Santos, 1998. "The importance of bank seniority for relationship lending," Working Paper 9808, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0503001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  18. Enrico Perotti & Ernst Ludwig von Thadden, 2004. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-012/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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