Additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems
AbstractWe study the property of additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems. In bankruptcy problems we use this property to characterize the Talmudic rule proposed by Rabbi Ibn Ezra. Moreover we generalize this rule to every bankruptcy problem. Again, using additivity we characterize the rights egalitarian solution in allocation problems.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Spanish Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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