Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
AbstractFor the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we offer simple criteria to compare rules on the basis of the Lorenz order. These criteria pertain to three families of rules. The first family contains the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules (Thomson, 2007a). The second family, which also contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, is obtained from the first one by exchanging, for each problem, how well agents with relatively larger claims are treated as compared to agents with relatively smaller claims. The third family consists of consistent rules (Young, 1987). We also address the issue whether certain operators on the space of rules preserve the Lorenz order.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 538.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
claims problems; constrained equal awards rule; constrained equal losses rule; Talmud rule; minimal overlap rule; Piniles’ rule; constrained egalitarian rule; ICI rules; CIC rules; consistent rules; Lorenz domination; operators.;
Other versions of this item:
- William Thomson, 2012. "Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 547-569, August.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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