Why people reach intermediate agreements? Axiomatic and strategic justifications
AbstractAs Roemer (1986) points out, things become more interesting once we include information. In this paper, following the line started by Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008), we define both a lower and an upper bounds on awards in the framework of the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem (Gadea et al. (2010)), which is an extended bankruptcy problem enriched with a Commonly Accepted Equity Principles set and the idea of treat everybody as evenly as possible (Dutta and Ray (1989) and Arin (2007), among others). Moreover, we contribute with the definition of the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive procedure, which consists on the recursive imposition of both bounds, providing a natural way of justifying the convex combination of bankruptcy rules. Specifically, we retrieve the midpoint of extreme and opposite well known ways of distributing the resource. Finally, we complete our analysis from the strategic viewpoint, obtaining similar results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2010-29.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
bankruptcy problems; lower bound; upper bound; duality; recursivity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2010-10-09 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. Arin, 2007. "Egalitarian Distributions In Coalitional Models," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 47-57.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Diego Dominguez, 2007. "Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Working Papers 0705, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- William Thomson, 2007.
"Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims,"
RCER Working Papers
538, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- William Thomson, 2012. "Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 547-569, August.
- Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
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