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A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation

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  • Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.

Abstract

In a recent article, Fragnelli and Gagliardo [Fragnelli, V., Gagliardo, S., (2012). Cooperative models for allocating an object. Economics Letters 117, 227–229] propose several procedures to solve a basic problem of fair allocation. We scrutinize their proposal and contextualize it into recent developments of the literature on bankruptcy problems. Our analysis supports two of the procedures they propose; namely, the Shapley and Talmud rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 118 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 393-395

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:393-395

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Fair allocation; Bankruptcy problems; Bounds; Shapley; Talmud;

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  1. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2012. "Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 185-197.
  2. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
  3. Fragnelli, Vito & Gagliardo, Stefano, 2012. "Cooperative models for allocating an object," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 227-229.
  4. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., . "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Moulin, H., 1988. "Welfare Bounds In The Fair Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 106-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  7. Jens L. Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars P. Osterdal, 2012. "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Working Papers 12.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  8. Robert Aumann, 2010. "Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the Talmud," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 3-10, March.
  9. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 73-84, August.
  10. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  11. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003. "The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2001. "Additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 223-229.
  13. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  14. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  15. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  16. Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Allocation Rules for a Commonly Owned Technology: The Average Cost Lower Bound," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 490-507, May.
  17. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  18. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
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