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A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism

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  • Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
  • Roemer, John E.

Abstract

Resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice. We show in this paper that they share a solid common ground. To do so, we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agentsʼ abilities (to transform the resource into an interpersonally comparable outcome) and starting points may differ. Both conceptions of egalitarianism are naturally modeled in this context as two allocation rules. The two rules are jointly characterized by the combination of three appealing axioms: no-domination, solidarity, and composition.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 832-841

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:832-841

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Resource allocation; Egalitarianism; Welfare; No-domination; Solidarity; Composition;

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  1. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June.
  3. Sen, Amartya, 1973. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198281931.
  4. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521887427, October.
  5. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  8. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, . "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2184, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November.
  10. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  11. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
  12. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  13. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2008. "Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199215911.
  14. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  15. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
  16. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Jens Leth Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2012. "Rationing with Baselines: The Composition Extension Operator," MSAP Working Paper Series 08_2012, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
  2. Thomson, William, 2012. "On The Axiomatics Of Resource Allocation: Interpreting The Consistency Principle," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(03), pages 385-421, November.
  3. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

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