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Updating Claims in Bankruptcy Problems

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Author Info
M. Josune Albizuri
Justin Leroux () (IEA, HEC Montréal)
José Manuel Zarzuelo

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Abstract

We reexamine the consistency axiom in bankruptcy problems and propose arguments in favor of an alternative definition of a reduced problem. The classical definition updates the size of the estate while keeping agents' claims unaffected. Instead, we suggest updating agents' claims along with the estate. The resulting consistency axiom characterizes the well-known Random Arrival rule as the unique bilaterally consistent extension of the Contested Garment rule to many agents. We also establish that our definition of a reduced bankruptcy problem corresponds to the definition of a reduced TU game proposed in Hart & Mas-Colell (Econometrica, 1989).

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File URL: http://www2.hec.ca/iea/cahiers/2008/iea0808_jleroux.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 08-08.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0808

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Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7
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C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.


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