Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

On The Axiomatics Of Resource Allocation: Interpreting The Consistency Principle

Contents:

Author Info

  • Thomson, William

Abstract

An allocation rule is consistent if the recommendation it makes for each problem “agrees” with the recommendation it makes for each associated reduced problem, obtained by imagining some agents leaving with their assignments. Some authors have described the consistency principle as a “fairness principle”. Others have written that it is not about fairness, that it should be seen as an “operational principle”. We dispute the particular fairness interpretations that have been offered for consistency, but develop a different and important fairness foundation for the principle, arguing that it can be seen as the result of adding “some” efficiency to a “post-application” and efficiency-free expression of solidarity in response to population changes. We also challenge the interpretations of consistency as an operational principle that have been given, but identify a sense in which such an interpretation can be supported. We review and assess the other interpretations of the principle, as “robustness”, “coherence”, and “reinforcement”.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0266267112000296
File Function: link to article abstract page
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.

Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
Issue (Month): 03 (November)
Pages: 385-421

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:28:y:2012:i:03:p:385-421_00

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_EAPProvider-Email:journals@cambridge.org

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., . "A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2400, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
  3. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2008. "Axiomatic resource allocation for heterogeneous agents," CORE Discussion Papers 2008018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2014. "Strategy-proof package assignment," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 5/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  2. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:28:y:2012:i:03:p:385-421_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.