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A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism

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  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)

  • John E. Roemer

    ()
    (Department of Political Science, Yale University)

Abstract

Resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice. We show in this paper that they share a solid common ground. To do so, we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agents’ abilities (to transform the resource into an interpersonally comparable outcome) and starting points may differ. Both conceptions of egalitarianism are naturally modeled in this context as two allocation rules. The two rules are jointly characterized by the combination of three appealing axioms: priority, solidarity, and composition.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11.12.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:11.12

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Keywords: Team production; budget constraints; efficiency; manipulability; impartiality;

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References

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  1. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
  2. Sen, Amartya, 1973. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198281931.
  3. SPRUMONT, Yves & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: An Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach," Cahiers de recherche 06-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
  5. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521887427, April.
  6. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  8. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  9. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012. "Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591.
  10. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
  11. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November.
  12. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  13. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June.
  14. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., . "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  16. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomson, William, 2012. "On The Axiomatics Of Resource Allocation: Interpreting The Consistency Principle," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(03), pages 385-421, November.
  2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "Rationing with baselines: The composition extension operator," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 23/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  3. William Thomson, 2013. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update," RCER Working Papers 578, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

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